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Comament
SECTION 357(c): THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY
BETWEEN ACCRUAL AND CASH
BASIS TAXPAYERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Incorporation of an existing business almost invariably raises
the question of whether the corporation should assume the busi-
ness's liabilities and whether such an assumption creates income
tax problems under section 357 of the Internal Revenue Code.1
Cash basis taxpayers in particular have encountered special prob-
lems when incorporating a partnership or sole proprietorship and
often have received an unexpected tax liability in the year of incor-
poration.
Generally, gain or loss is not recognized when assets and liabil-
ities are transferred to a controlled corporation solely in exchange
for the stock or securities of that corporation.2 Section 357(c) of
1. The general rule of § 357 provides for nonrecognition where liabili-
ties are assumed by the corporate transferee. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 357 (c) [hereinafter cited as CODE] provides:
Liabilities in Excess of Basis.-(1) In General.-In the case of an exchange-(A) to which section 351 applies, or(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a
plan of reorganization within the meaning of
section 368 (a) (1) (D),
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus
the amount of the liabilities to which the property is
subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the
property transferred pursuant to such exchange, then
such excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset or of property which is
not a capital asset, as the case may be.(2) Exceptions.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any
exchange to which-(A) subsection (b) (1) of this section applies, or(B) section 371 or 374 applies.
2. CODE § 351 provides:
(a) GN aRA RuLE. No gain or loss shall be recognized if
property is transferred to a corporation ... by one or more
persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such
corporation and immediately after the exchange such per-
son or persons are in control . . . of the corporation. For
purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for serv-
ices shall not be considered as issued in return for prop-
erty.
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the Internal Revenue Code, however, requires that gain be recog-
nized to the extent that the liabilities assumed (plus liabilities to
which the property transferred is subject) exceed the aggregate
adjusted basis of property transferred to the new corporation.3
The cash basis taxpayer's unexpected tax liability results from a
very literal interpretation of section 357(c). Under this interpre-
tation, for the cash basis taxpayer, the adjusted basis of accounts
receivable is zero while the accounts payable are liabilities which
are valued at their face amount. Therefore, unless other property
with a substantial aggregate adjusted basis is transferred, instant
income is recognized under the section 357(c) formula.4 Recently
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Bongiovanni v.
Commissioner,3 disagreed with the prevailing literal interpretation
and held that the liabilities referred to in section 357(c) were tax
liabilities and not accounting liabilities. Accordingly, the court
held that, for tax purposes, a cash basis taxpayer's accounts pay-
able should not be valued at face amount but at zero. The court
justified this distinction on the grounds that, since the cash basis
taxpayer had not been allowed a deduction for the accounts pay-
able, a contrary determination would promote inequality between
accrual and cash basis taxpayers.
This comment will examine the history and purpose behind
section 357(c), including an analysis of the defects in pre-1954 law
which section 357(c) was designed to remedy, to determine the
proper application of the section when accounts receivable and
(b) REcEiPT or PRoPERTY.-If subsection (a) would apply
to an exchange but for the fact that there is received in
addition to the stock or securities permitted to be received
under subsection (a), other property or money then-(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized,
but not in excess of-
(A) the amount of money received, plus(B) the fair market value of such other property
received; and(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(e) CRoss REFmzENCES.-
(1) For special rule where another party to the ex-
change assumes a liability, or acquires property subject
to a liability, see section 357.
3. In the interest of clarity, the phrase "liabilities assumed" will here-
inafter refer both to liabilities assumed by the corporate transferee
as well as liabilities to which the property transferred is subject.
4. Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966); Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 CUM. BULL.
53. It should be noted that when more than one transferor is in-
volved in the exchange, the IRS has ruled that each must be viewed
separately to determine individual tax liability. See Rev. Rul. 66-
142, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 66.
5. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
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accounts payable are involved. In addition, the implications and
inconsistencies of both the Bongiovanni decision and the "majority"
view of section 357(c) will be explored to determine whether equal-
ity between cash basis and accrual taxpayers exists under either
interpretation.
IL BACKGROUND
Section 357 applies only to tax-free exchanges meeting the re-
quirements of section 351. The basic premise of section 351(a) is
that a transfer of property to a corporation controlled 6! by the
transferor in exchange for its stock or securities merely changes
the form of his investment and should not be an occasion for recog-
nition of gain.7 As a practical matter, the taxpayer in such a situ-
ation has neither realized a gain nor closed out a losing venture.
However, section 351(b) provides that if money or other property
is received on the exchange in addition to the stock or securities,
the tax-free status of the transaction is not affected but the trans-
feror must recognize gain to the extent of the sum of the money
and the fair market value of any property received.
Under section 112(c) (1), a predecessor of section 351(b), tax-
payers and government thought an assumption of liabilities by the
transferee corporation did not result in recognizable gain.8 This
notion was abruptly dispelled in United States v. Hendler 9 where
the Supreme Court held that, in an otherwise tax-free reorganiza-
tion,10 the assumption and payment of the transferor's liability by
the corporate transferee constituted income to the transferor:
6. The word "control" is a term of art when used in the nonrecognition
provisions relating to a tax free incorporation. As defined in CODE
§ 368 (c):
[Tlhe term "control" means the ownership of stock pos-
sessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80
percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of the corporation.
7. See Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.
1940). See also B. Bnrxn? & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INco1E TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 3.01, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as BITrKER & EusTic.].
8. Burke & Chisholm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free Incor-
porations, 25 TAX L. REv. 211, 212 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Burke
& Chisholm]; Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Ex-
changes, 50 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Surrey].
9. 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
10. CODE § 361 currently provides for tax-free treatment of reorganiza-
tions defined in CODE § 368. Hendler arose under Int. Rev. Code
of 1928, § 112(c) (1), a provision which embodied transactions pres-
ently covered by both CODE §§ 361 and 351.
530 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 52, NO. 4 (1973)
The transaction . . . under which the Borden Company assumed
and paid the debt and obligation of the Hendler Company is to be
regarded in substance as though the $534,297.40 had been paid di-
rectly to the Hendler Company.... Its gain was as real and
substantial as if the money had been paid it and then paid over
by it to its creditors. The discharge of liability by the payment
of the Hendler Company's indebtedness constituted income to the
Hendler Company and is to be taxed as such."
The Hendler decision had two far-reaching consequences.
12
First, the decision severely impaired the ease with which an indi-
vidual or corporation could readjust its legal form of business op-
eration. In order to avoid recognizing income, the transferor would
be required to liquidate some of his assets in order to dispose of
his liabilities before transferring the remainder of his business to
the corporation. This result was wholly inimical to the purpose
behind the nonrecognition provisions then in effect.' 3
Secondly, the decision created the possibility of a major loss in
future revenue. Because of basis provisions then in effect, prior
transferors would have been entitled to a step up in the basis of
stock received on earlier exchanges whether gain had previously
been recognized or not.' 4 Similarly, the transferee corporation
also would have been entitled to increase its basis in the assets re-
ceived by the amount of gain that should have been recognized by
the transferor.' 5
As a result, Congress, in order to preserve the spirit of the tax
free exchange provisions and prevent any loss of government rev-
enues, passed section 112(k), which effectively overruled the Hend-
ler result.'6
11. 303 U.S. at 566.
12. For a complete discussion of the impact of the Hendler decision,
see Surrey, supra note 8, at 11.
13. The Senate Report on the Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c), the pre-
cursor of all the statutory provisions regarding tax-free exchanges,
observed: "Probably no part of the present income tax law has
been productive of so much uncertainty or has more seriously inter-
fered with necessary business readjustments."
S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1934, § 113 (a) (6). However, where the statute of
limitations had not run, the government was still free to assert a
deficiency if gain had not been recognized on the exchange. See
Surrey, supra note 8, at 11-12.
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1928 § 113(a) (7)-(8). See Surrey, supra note 8,
at 12-13.
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 112(k) [hereinafter cited as 1939 Code]
provided:
Assumption of Liability not Recognized.-Where upon an
exchange the taxpayer receives as part of the consideration
property which would be permitted by subsection (b) (4) or
SECTION 357(c)
Section 112(k) had a dual purpose. First, it provided that the
assumption of liabilities in an otherwise tax-free exchange did not
result in a taxable event. Second, it established criteria to remedy
any possible abuses connected with the assumption of liabilities on
the exchange. Section 357(c), the provision involved in the Bongi-
ovanni decision, was added to the 1954 successor of section 112(k)
and had no counterpart in prior law. To understand the reason for
its enactment and the manner in which it should be interpreted, it
is important to discern the abuses against which section 112(k)
was directed, and its inability to provide a complete remedy.1"
III. TAX AVOIDANCE AND BUSINESS PURPOSE
The main thrust of section 112(k) was to provide for nonrecog-
nition where liabilities were assumed by the transferee corpora-
(5) of this section to be received without the recognition of
gain ... and as part of the consideration another party to
the exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer or ac-
quires ... property subject to a liability, such assumption
or acquisition shall not be considered as "other property or
money" received by the taxpayer ... ; except that if . . . it
appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with
respect to the assumption or acquisition was a purpose to
avoid federal income tax on the exchange, or, if not such
purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose such as-
sumption or acquisition (irx the amount of the liability)
shall . . . be treated as money received by the taxpayer on
the exchange....
In its technical explanation of section 112(k), the Ways and Means
Committee stated:
In typical transactions changing the form or entity of a
business it is not customary to liquidate the liabilities of
the business and such liabilities are almost invariably as-
sumed by the corporation which continues the business.
Your committee therefore believes that such a broad inter-
pretation, the Hendler decision . . . will largely nullify theprovisions of existing law which postpone the recognition of
gain in such cases.
H.R. Rep. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1940).
17. Section 112(k) was reenacted in § 357(a) and (b) in the 1954 CODE
without substantial change. One change which was fairly significant,
however, was that where the taxpayer's purpose on the exchange is
one of tax avoidance, or where there is a lack of business purpose,
then the total amount of liabilities assumed is considered as money
received rather than just the specific tainted liability. Although on
its face the statute purports to apply to both the tax avoidance pur-
pose and the business purpose clauses, the Senate Committee Report
on the 1954 CoD. explained that this provision only came into effect
where a tax avoidance purpose existed:
The language of subsection (b), relating to assumption of
liability for tax avoidance purpose, has been changed in
one respect from existing law. Where such a tax avoidance
purpose exists, the total amount of the liabilities assumed
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tion. But it also provided that with respect to the assumption or
acquisition of liabilities, if the taxpayer's purpose was to avoid
taxes, or if the taxpayer lacked a bona fide business purpose, the
amount of the tainted liability assumed would be considered money
received and therefore recognized as gain.' 8 Furthermore, Con-
gress required that the taxpayer bear the burden of proof on this
issue, and that he establish his proof by a clear preponderance of
evidence. 19
Section 112(k) was intended to handle possible abuses whereby
taxpayers might incur heavy liabilities just prior to incorporation
and thus escape taxation on the exchange. 20 For example, since a
loan is not a taxable event, the taxpayer could borrow prior to in-
corporation, pocket the proceeds, and then transfer the encum-
bered property to a controlled corporation. The taxpayer would
therefore have an unrestricted right to the proceeds without paying
any tax on the exchange. It also was meant to tax those individ-
uals who borrow for personal reasons and then attempt to transfer
the liabilities to a controlled corporation. 21  Since the remedial
provisions of section 112(k) were intended to further only business
readjustments, this seems consistent with the purpose behind its
enactment.
Ascertaining why section 357 (c) was needed in order to aug-
ment further the existing exceptions to the general rule of non-
recognition is difficult. There were no judicial decisions constru-
will be considered as money received by the taxpayer and
not merely a particular liability with respect to which the
tax avoidance purpose existed.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1954). The question con-
cerning its precise application, however, is not firmly resolved at this
time. See Burke & Chisholm, supra note 8, at 216 n.21 and accom-
panying text.
18. The Commissioner has argued that there must also be a valid
corporate business purpose for the assumption. In Easson v. Com-
missioner, 294 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1961), the court rejected this
argument and the government has since conceded the point in Jewell
v. United States, 330 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Dry-
brough v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967); W.H.B. Simp-
son, 43 T.C. 900 (1965). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.351-3(a)6,-(b) (7)
(1955).
19. The regulations go one step further and require that "the presence
of a bona fide business purpose" be "unmistakable." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.357-1(c) (1955).
20. See, e.g., Bryan v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960);
Brrr.n & EUSTIcE, supra note 7, 1 3.07, at 24-25.
21. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wheeler, 342 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1965); Eck v.
United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1227 (D.N.D. 1969); John G.
StolJ, 38 T.C. 223 (1962).
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ing the tax avoidance and business purpose clauses prior to 1954,
and just why Congress felt section 357(c) was necessary to remedy
defects in the existing statutory framework is unclear. However,
an examination of some post-1954 decisions construing section
112(k) and its successor, section 357(b), illustrate their scope, and
the nature of the abuses which they were equipped to handle as
well as those which they could not.
The first case decided under section 112(k) was Bryan v. Com-
missioner.22 The taxpayer had purchased four tracts of land on
which he had constructed houses and made other improvements at
a total cost of 1,485,701.96 dollars. During the construction phase,
the taxpayer obtained loans totalling 1,692,350 dollars, which ex-
ceeded his cost by 157,798.04 dollars. He then organized four cor-
porations and transferred the four tracts of land, each to a sep-
arate corporation, in exchange for stock and the corporations' as-
sumption of the loans encumbering the property.
The taxpayer argued that since there was no provision com-
parable to section 357(c) in the 1939 Code, the fact that his liabili-
ties exceeded basis was immaterial.23 The court rejected this ar-
gument and held that the critical issue was the taxpayer's purpose
in arranging for the assumption by the corporation on the ex-
change. The court relied on two factors in ascertaining the tax-
payer's purpose: first, the loans did exceed his adjusted basis in
the property; and, second, the loans were incurred just prior to in-
corporation. It found, in view of the circumstances and nature of
the liabilities, that his principal purpose was tax avoidance. There-
fore, the court required him to pay tax on the total amount of lia-
bilities assumed. 24
In Drybrough v. Commissioner,25 decided under the 1954 code,26
the taxpayer had mortgaged four properties which he owned for a
22. 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960). Although this case was decided after
1954, the events which gave rise to tax consequences occurred prior
to that date. Therefore, the 1939 Code, § 112 (k) was controlling.
23. What the taxpayer failed to realize was that a tax avoidance purpose
as defined by § 112(k) could exist whether liabilities exceeded basis
or not. The drafters of § 357 (c) expressly recognized this possibility
and provided that in the event both apply, § 357(b) is controlling.
24. Although it seems unfair that he was taxed on the total amount of
the liabilities, the basis provisions do allow the taxpayer to increase
his basis in the stock received by the amount recognized on the ex-
change. But he must also decrease his basis in the stock received
by the amount of the liabilities assumed by the corporate transferee.
CODE § 358.
25. 376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967).
26. Even though Drybrough was decided under the 1954 CoDE, its main
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total of 600,000 dollars. These properties were encumbered in 1953.
In 1957, shortly before he formed five corporations, he mortgaged
a fifth piece of property for 150,000 dollars. Four of the new corpo-
rations assumed the 1953 mortgage and the fifth assumed the 1957
mortgage. The properties and their adjusted bases are set forth
in the following table:
ADJUSTED LIABILITY
PROPERTY TRANSFERRED BASIS ASSUMED
1. 800 South Fourth Street $ 83,682.17 $100,000
2. 720 South Fifth Street $ 83,293.29 $ 75,000
3. 725 South Fourth Street $ 79,955.94 $175,000
4. 655 South Fifth Street $161,076.16 $250,000
5. 620 South Fifth Street $103,840.12 $149,000
On his tax return for 1957, Drybrough reported 223,806.12 dol-
lars as long term capital gain arising from the transfer of the prop-
erties and the corporations' assumption of the liabilities since the
liabilities exceeded his aggregate adjusted basis under section
357(c). 2 7 The Commissioner argued that the tax avoidance and
business purpose clauses28 should prevail, and that the total lia-
bilities should be taken into income rather than merely the amount
that exceeded basis.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed in part with
the taxpayer and in part with the Commissioner. The court ob-
served: "[T ] he purpose to avoid income tax is precisely narrowed
to a purpose 'with respect to the assumption' and to a purpose to
avoid income tax 'on the exchange.' ,29
Although the proceeds of the 1953 mortgage were used to pay
off existing mortgages and to purchase tax exempt securities, the
court held:
We cannot find or infer, however, that the purposes thus served
revealed as a matter of fact or law a purpose to avoid income
tax "on the exchange" made four years later when in 1957 Dry-
brough's business as an investor in real estate was converted as a
proprietorship to corporate enterprises. 30
The court also found that the taxpayer's desire to remain liquid
concern was the interpretation of CODE § 357(b) (1), which was sub-
stantially the same as the 1939 Code, § 112 (k).
27. This argument was essentially the same as that used by the taxpayer
in Bryan v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960). As previ-
ously discussed both §§ 357 (b) (1) and (c) theoretically can apply to
the same transaction, but § 357(b) (1) always controls.
28. CODE § 357(b).
29. 376 F.2d at 356.
30. Id.
SECTION 357 (c)
as an investor was a sufficient business purpose for not paying off
the 1953 mortgage before effecting its transfer.31
The court took a different view of the 1957 mortgage. The court
agreed with the Tax Court's finding that the debt was created
solely in anticipation of the exchange3 2 and held that the taxpay-
er's primary purpose was tax avoidance. In addition, since the pro-
ceeds were not used to carry on the purposes of the business enter-
prise, but were instead used for purely personal reasons, the court
found that the taxpayer in Drybrough lacked a valid business pur-
pose.
In Easson v. Commissioner,33 a decision under the 1939 code,
the taxpayer mortgaged his apartment house for 250,000 dollars.
Later in the same year, he formed a corporation and transferred
the property subject to the mortgage to a controlled corporation
in exchange for all of its capital stock. He did, however, remain
personally liable on the notes.
The Tax Court specifically found that the taxpayer had a le-
gitimate business purpose for the assumption and that his princi-
pal purpose was not tax avoidance. However, at the time the
property was transferred, the unpaid mortgage exceeded the ad-
justed basis of the property by 159,849.15 dollars. The basis provi-
sions at that time required the transferor to reduce his substituted
basis in the stock received by the face amount of the liabilities
assumed.3 4 The application of this provision would have reduced
the transferor's basis in the stock to a minus 159,000 dollars.3 5
31. This court took a liberal view of the phrase "bona fide business
purpose." For other articulations of the same view, see Jewell v.
United States, 330 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1964) and Easson v. Commis-
sioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961). But see Campbell v. Wheeler,
342 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1965). For a collection of authorities construing
the "business purpose" clause, see 3 J. MERTEns, LAW Or FEDERAL
INcoMdE TAXATiON § 20.158 (1972); Burke & Chisholm, supra note
8, at 217.
32. The court relied primarily on a letter written by Drybrough shortly
before the exchange wherein he stated he was eager to mortgage the
property to the limit before incorporation. 376 F.2d at 358.
33. 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
34. 1939 Code, § 113(a) (6).
35. At the time of the transfer, the taxpayer's basis in the property was
$87,214.86 and its fair market value was $320,000. The principal
balance of the mortgage was $247,064.01. Since the 1939 Code,
§ 113 (a) (6) required that any liability assumed must be treated as
money received, the taxpayer's substituted basis of $87,214.86 would
have to be reduced by the amount of the mortgage viz:
$ 87,214.86 - adjusted basis in property transferred
- 247,064.01 - amount of mortgage
-$159,849.15 - taxpayer's basis in stock received
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The Tax Court specifically found that property cannot have a neg-
ative basis. Therefore, the court held that unless the taxpayer
were taxed on the exchange, the proceeds would permanently
avoid taxation.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's holding
and found that property can have a negative basis. In addition,
the court agreed with the lower court's finding that no tax avoid-
ance motive existed and that the taxpayer had a valid business
purpose. Therefore, the total amount of the liabilities went unrec-
ognized until such time as the taxpayer sold his stock, even though
the liabilities assumed exceeded the adjusted basis.
In all three decisions, Bryan, Drybrough and Easson, the statu-
tory language existing prior to enactment of section 357(c) could
solve the problem of liabilities in excess of basis only in certain
situations. The fact that liabilities exceeded basis was not in itself
evidence of tax avoidance; the purpose to avoid taxes or a lack of
a bona fide business purpose must be with respect to the assump-
tion on the exchange. Since these motives are not always present
where liabilities exceed basis under the existing law, that amount
would have gone unrecognized. But, irrespective of a purpose to
avoid taxes, the individual taxpayer, when relieved of property
and the liability, still is given an unrestricted right to proceeds
which exceed his original cost. No argument can be made that
the transaction would still be open because the taxpayer has trans-
ferred the property as well as the mortgage upon incorporation.
Furthermore, the basis provisions then in effect (as well as
those now in effect under section 358) would dictate a negative
basis in the stock or securities received by the taxpayer unless gain
is recognized. Although one commentator has argued that a nega-
tive basis results in tax avoidance,36 others have observed that it
results only in tax postponement.37 Regardless of which view is
"correct", it does substantially impair the collectibility of federal
income tax. The greater the negative basis allowed, the less likely
the holder is to dispose of the stock. In addition, by deferral of
tax liability, the transferor receives a windfall over and above what
36. Note, Section 357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
1154, 1160 n.31 (1967). The writer maintains that if the stock is
never sold the transferor will never be required to pay tax on the
proceeds. But this is always true when a liability is transferred to a
controlled corporation, whether it exceeds adjusted basis or not.
The real question is not whether gain is realized, but when should
it be recognized.
37. Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HAv. L. Rzv. 1352, 1355 (1962); Spears,
Mortgages in Excess of Basis, U. So. CAL. 1959 TAx INST. 883, 886.
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he has actually invested in the property. The negative basis prob-
lem, as well as the possibility of allowing a windfall where liabili-
ties exceed basis, were two good reasons for Congress to enact sec-
tion 357(c) in order to remedy defects in the existing statutes.
IV. MORTGAGE IN EXCESS OF ADJUSTED BASIS
Although the precise results of the above decisions were not
known to Congress when section 357(c) was enacted, they do dem-
onstrate the inadequacy of the pre-1954 law. There were, further-
more, decisions prior to 1954 which predicted the possibility of rev-
enue impairment unless statutory changes were enacted.3 8 These
decisions concerned the acquisition and disposition of property en-
cumbered with mortgages.
The leading case, Crane v. Commissioner,39 established two
broad legal propositions. First, a purchaser's cost of acquiring
property includes the amount of any mortgage which the pur-
chaser takes the property subject to or personally assumes.4 0 Sec-
ond, the seller must include, as part of the proceeds received upon
the sale, the amount of the mortgage on the property. These rules
applied whether the seller was personally liable or not. Their pur-
pose was to insure that the parties to the transaction did not re-
ceive a windfall by way of converting the proceeds to personal use,
or by taking advantage of depreciation deductions without having
to pay tax consequences. 4 1
Since the mere acquisition of mortgage proceeds in excess of
basis is not in itself a taxable event, it does create a problem where
the property is transferred to a controlled corporation. Woodsam
Associates Inc. v. Commissioner42 considered such a factual situa-
tion. The legal issue was the corporation's basis in the property,
which in turn depended upon the transferor's basis. The taxpayer
argued that, when the mortgage was obtained, the amount of the
38. One commentator has suggested that these decisions were the pri-
mary reason § 357 (c) was enacted, a view which seems substantially
correct. See Note, Section 357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1161 (1967).
39. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
40. An alternative to this approach has been suggested. See Parker v.
Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950) (Magruder, J., concurring).
41. See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), where the court
held that even though the taxpayer was not personally liable on the
mortgage and received no money when it was disposed of, he none-
theless realized gain on a disposition where depreciation deductions
had decreased the adjusted basis below the principal amount of
the mortgage.
42. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
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proceeds which exceeded the shareholder's adjusted basis was a
gain taxable to her at that time. This was based on the fact that
she was not personally liable on the debt. Accordingly, she ar-
gued that the shareholder's adjusted basis should have been in-
creased by the amount of gain. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that whether the mortgagor is personally liable or not is
immaterial. The transaction was considered open, and the court
held that realization should be postponed until there was final
disposition of the property by the corporation.
The Woodsam court did not specifically consider whether the
shareholder would have been taxed at the time of the exchange,
but it seems clear from the opinion that gain would not have been
recognized. This follows from the court's reasoning that the trans-
fer to the corporation did not involve a final disposition. Thus,
after the taxpayer's adjustment of basis in the stock received, she
would have had a negative basis.43
43. Rounding off the numbers, the computations would be as follows:
Shareholder's original basis
in the property transferred $300,000
Depreciation deductions - 30,000
Adjusted basis at time of
transfer 270,000
Amount of mortgage assumed -400,000
Adjusted basis in stock received $(130,000)
The computations would be the same under current code provisions,
except that § 357 (c) would require recognition of the $130,000, which
would increase the taxpayer's basis to zero. The present basis pro-
vision, CoDE § 358, provides in part:
(a) GENEmL Rurx.-In the case of an exchange to which
section 351 ... applies-(1) NONRECOGNITON PRoPERTY.-The basis of the prop-
erty permitted to be received under such section
without the recognition of gain or loss shall be the
same as that of the property exchanged-(A) decreased by-(i) the fair market value of any other
property (except money) received by the
taxpayer,(ii) the amount of any money received by
the taxpayer, and(iii) the amount of loss to the taxpayer
which was recognized on such exchange,
and(B) increased by-
Ci) the amount which was treated as a div-
idend, and(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer
which was recognized on such exchange....
() ASSlUMPTION oF IIABILn-.-Where, as part of the con-
sideration to the taxpayer, another party to the exchange
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The Woodsam decision was a clear indication of the potential
for tax avoidance where property mortgaged in excess of its ad-
justed basis is transferred to a controlled corporation. It is con-
ceded that section 357(c) does not contain any specific limitation
that the liabilities must encumber specific property nor does the
legislative history clearly state any specific limitations. However,
the examples illustrating the principle behind section 357(c) in
both the Senate and House explanations of the act suggest that
this was the evil sought to be avoided.44
V. OTHER LIABILITIES
Undoubtedly, Congress did not intend to limit the application
of section 357(c) to those situations where property is specifically
encumbered. 45 To do so would not have cured the negative basis
problem. The taxpayer would still have been able to incur liabili-
ties far in excess of the cost of his assets without encumbering spe-
cific property. Unless he were taxed on the exchange, he would
receive a windfall gain in the same manner as where property is
specifically encumbered. Therefore, the broad Congressional lan-
guage must have been intended to include these types of liabilities.
This does not necessarily mean that Congress meant to in-
clude all items commonly referred to as liabilities. More likely,
Congress was simply unaware of the problems that might result
if section 357(c) were applied to certain types of liabilities such as
the liabilities of a cash basis taxpayer.46 Indeed, in several in-
assumed a liability of the taxpayer or acquired from the
taxpayer property subject to a liability, such assumption or
acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall, for pur-
poses of this section, be treated as money received by the
taxpayer on the exchange.
44. The example cited by the Senate and House Committee reports is
the same:
Thus, if an individual transfers, under section 351, property
having a basis in his hands of $20,000, but subject to a
mortgage of $50,000, to a corporation controlled by him,
such individual will be subject to tax with respect to$30,000, the excess of the amount of liability over the ad-justed basis of the property in the hands of the trans-
feror.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1954); H. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A129 (1954).
45. See Testor v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 1964).
46. A cash basis taxpayer's liability as used in this comment means any
expense or indebtedness incurred during the ordinary course of busi-
ness which would be allowable as a deduction, but which has not
previously been deducted from the individual's income because the
individual is not allowed a deduction until it is paid.
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stances it appears as though the Commissioner himself was una-
ware of its ramifications for the cash basis taxpayer.47
When section 357(c) is applied to a mortgage in excess of ad-
justed basis, it provides equal treatment no matter what method
of accounting is used by the transferor. However, when applied to
a cash basis taxpayer transferring accounts receivable and ac-
counts payable, it has a tendency to frustrate the purpose behind
the nonrecognition provisions of section 35148 as well as legislation
enacted to remedy the Hendler result.49
A. Peter Raich-THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION
In Peter Raich50 the Tax Court for the first time squarely faced
the issue of whether a cash basis taxpayer transferring an existing
business should be required to recognize income on the exchange
under section 357(c), even though the book value of the assets is
far in excess of liabilities. Prior to incorporation Raich conducted
a contracting business using the calendar year cash basis method
of accounting. Early in 1961 he transferred to a controlled corpo-
ration all of the assets of the proprietorship totalling 88,613.39 dol-
lars, including 77,361.66 dollars of trade accounts receivables. He
also transferred 45,992.81 dollars of liabilities of which 37,719.78
dollars were accounts payable. In exchange he received all of the
issued stock of the corporation plus a short term promissory note
in the face amount of 16,280.58 dollars. 51 Because the business
was on the cash basis method of accounting, none of the receiv-
47. There were two decisions involving the transfer of accounts receiv-
able and accounts payable prior to the Peter Raich decision. Testor
v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964); Arthur L. Kniffen,
39 T.C. 553 (1962). Both of these decisions involved cash basis tax-
payers and in each case the accounts receivable were valued at face
rather than zero for purposes of § 357 (c). Although their adjusted
basis was not in issue in either case, the IRS did not disallow the
taxpayers' original determination of adjusted basis. This position
was exactly the opposite as that taken in Raich where accounts re-
ceivable were given an adjusted basis of zero.
48. See Committee Report, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
49. If the term "liabilities" as used in § 357 (c) includes the accounts
payable of a cash basis taxpayer, it is tantamount to requiring him
to liquidate his assets and liabilities before changing his form of
business. This result conflicts with the congressional purpose behind
the enactment of the nonrecognition provisions. See Committee Re-
port, supra note 16.
50. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
51. The taxpayer had guaranteed the collection of the receivables prior
to incorporation, but since $3,525.08 proved uncollectible, the face
amount was reduced $12,755.50 which was paid off in full in less
than 2 years. The short term note was treated by the Commissioner
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ables 52 had been taken into income nor had the accounts payable
been deducted.5 3
The Tax Court held that a literal interpretation of section
357(c) required its application to the above facts even though the
market value of the receivables exceeded the payables. The court
emphasized that the statute speaks solely in terms of the aggregate
adjusted basis of the property transferred and not market value.
The court then found that the taxpayer had an adjusted basis of
zero in the accounts receivable. As a result of this finding, Raich's
aggregate adjusted basis was only 11,251.73 dollars. Subtracting
this amount from the liabilities assumed, the court found that lia-
bilities exceeded basis by 34,741.08 dollars and held that this was
recognizable gain. 4
The taxpayer advanced three arguments. First, Congress did
not intend section 357(c) to apply where the transferor received
no economic benefit or gain. Second, section 357(c) was meant to
apply only where liabilities exceeded book value as well as ad-
justed basis. And, third, even if adjusted basis is the only stand-
as "boot" within the meaning of CoDE § 351(b). For a complete
discussion of short term notes and their relation to the term "stock or
securities" as used in CoDE § 351(a), see Br-nm & EusTicE, supra
note 7, f 3.04, at 3-14.
52. The transferor's balance sheet contained both "receivables," which
were valued at $1,833.97, and "trade accounts receivable." Although
the exact nature of the "receivables" and their distinction from the
"trade accounts receivable" is not known, the Commissioner did
allow the taxpayer to include them in his adjusted basis to the full
extent of their book value.
53. In a similar situation, the transferor in Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553,
566-67 (1962), contended that he was entitled to a deduction when
the corporation assumed his payables since it was an expense of his
business and he furnished the consideration for the transferee to
make the payments. The Tax Court, with a complete disregard of
the equities, rejected this contention as "obviously lacking in merit
and does not require "further discussion." Id. at 567.
54. The taxpayer's assets and liabilities prior to incorporation and his
aggregate adjusted basis were as follows:
Assets Amount or Value Adjusted Basis
Cash $ 1,045.40 $ 1,045.40
Trade Accounts Receivables 77,361.66 0
Receivables 1,833.97 1,833.97
Prepaid Rent 125.00 125.00
Equipment 13,621.30 8,247.36
Aggregate Adjusted Basis - $11,251.73
Liabilities
Trade Accounts Payable $37,719.78
Note Payable 8,273.03
Total Liabilities Assumed $45,992.81
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ard recognized, he at least should be able to offset his receivables
by the amount of his payables.
In regard to his first contention, as proof of Congressional intent,
he offered examples cited in the House and Senate Committee re-
ports illustrating the application of section 357(c). 55 The court
dismissed this argument by replying that, if Congress meant to
so limit the application of this section to these examples, neither
the plain meaning of the statute nor its legislative history indi-
cates it.-5
Although there are no specific words in the statute indicating
an intent to limit its application, the examples cited by the regula-
tions57 and the committee reports5 8 at least provide some evidence
of that intent. Despite such a harsh result, however, the court
refused to look behind the statute and its legislative history to as-
certain the problem that Congress sought to remedy.
The taxpayer's second argument, limiting application of section
357(c) to situations where liabilities exceed book value as well as
adjusted basis, was closely tied to his first contention. In effect, he
argued that Congress did not intend section 357(c) to apply where
book value exceeds the liabilities transferred, because the trans-
feror receives neither a benefit nor an economic gain. The court
observed that the statute speaks solely in terms of adjusted basis
and not book value. It therefore dismissed this contention, mainly
relying on prior decisions holding that receivables have a zero ba-
sis.59 This phase of the court's decision is proper since the tax-
payer had not taken these items into income.
Finally, in order to show a cost basis in his receivables, the tax-
payer attempted to demonstrate that the receivables were spe-
cifically encumbered by his payables, contending that the payables
were liens under state law. The court observed that the argument
was novel and, rather than specifically rejecting the theory, found
that the receivables were not in fact encumbered by liens. The
court, however, did recognize that the application of section 357(c)
in this situation conflicted with Congressional policy concerning
tax deferral in connection with business readjustments:
[W e are not unmindful that the result reached may conflict with
55. See Committee Reports, supra note 44.
56. 46 T.C. at 609.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(a) (1955).
58. See Committee Reports, pra note 44.
59. Helvering v. Cement Investors, 316 U.S. 527 (1942); P.A. Birren &
Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940); Ezo Products Co.,
37 T.C. 385 (1961).
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the well established intent of Congress to foster tax-free business
reorganizations. However, in the absence of a clearly expressed
congressional intent we decline to adopt a construction of section
357(c) which is supported neither by its language nor its legisla-
tive history.60
Thus, in spite of the poor result and the conflict with long-standing
Congressional policies, the court opted to follow the "unambiguous
language" of the statute. Furthermore, the Tax Court's decision
encourages exactly what the remedial legislation nullifying Hend-
ler sought to prevent: the necessity of liquidating assets and lia-
bilities before incorporation in order to avoid being taxed.61 The
Raich decision severely impedes a cash basis taxpayer from read-
justing his form of doing business without being subject to federal
income taxes.62
B. Bongiovanni v. Commissioner-TBE STRA ED INTERPRETATION
Although for several years this "unambiguous language" went
unassailed, the court in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,6 8 on indis-
tinguishable facts reached a completely opposite result. The tax-
payer in Bongiovanni operated a masonry contracting business as
a sole proprietorship prior to incorporating the business on April
15, 1966. The business used the cash basis method of accounting
until 1965 when it attempted to change to the accrual method un-
doubtedly to avoid the tax trap established by Raich. In exchange
for assets totalling 97,490 dollars, the taxpayer received all the is-
sued stock of the corporation; a promissory note with a face
amount of 51,253 dollars plus the corporation's assumption of ac-
counts payable in the amount of 17,237 dollars. Included in the as-
sets were the following items:
AMOUNT ADJUSTED
OR VALUE BASIS
Cash $ 223 $ 223
Trade Receivables 57,741 0
Office Equipment 1,160 1,160
Work-in-Process 22,762 0
Raw Materials 8,029 0
Tools & Supplies 4,575 0
$94,490 $1,383
60. 46 T.C. at 611.
61. See Committee Reports, supra note 16.
62. Admittedly, the harsh result of the Raich decision can be avoided
by prior tax planning. For example, the transferor could have re-
tained cash and receivables sufficient to pay the payables and trans-
ferred the remainder of the receivables to the corporation.
63. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
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The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's attempt to change
to the accrual method of accounting 4 and assessed a deficiency 5
in the amount of 5,778.49 dollars due to the inclusion of 15,854 dol-
lars in the taxpayer's income based on the Peter Raich decision.66
The Commissioner contended that the accounts receivable, work in
process and the raw materials had an adjusted basis of zero. There-
fore, the liabilities assumed which consisted of accounts payable
(for which a deduction was denied) exceeded the taxpayer's ad-
justed basis. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determi-
nations.
The issue, as framed by the Second Circuit, was whether sec-
tion 357(c) applies to a cash basis taxpayer's liabilities in the form
of trade accounts payable. The court distinguished accounting lia-
bilities from those recognized for tax purposes. It reasoned that
the accounts payable were accounting liabilities, but held that they
should not be recognized for tax purposes until they are paid. The
court determined that the word "liabilities" as used in section 357 (c)
refers only to tax liabilities and not mere accounting liabilities.
Although it is difficult to ascertain from the opinion precisely what
the term "tax liability" encompasses, the court did give the ex-
ample of "liens" in excess of tax costs, particularly mortgages en-
cumbering property transferred in a section 351 transaction.T
Since the accounts payable were not considered liabilities for pur-
poses of applying section 357(c), the taxpayer's aggregate adjusted
basis of the property transferred exceeded the liabilities assumed
by the corporate transferee. As a result, he was not required to
recognize gain under 357(c). The court argued that its decision
avoided inequality between taxpayers based solely upon differences
64. The court below focused primarily on this aspect of the decision and
concluded that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion in
disallowing the taxpayer's request for a change in accounting meth-
ods. It therefore held that the decision was controlled by Raich.
John P. Bongiovanni, 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f 71,262 (1972).
65. The Commissioner asserted a further deficiency of $12,080.44 based
upon the disallowance of the deduction the taxpayer took for the ac-
counts payable. In addition, it was determined that he had realized
taxable gain in the amount of $51,253 because the promissory note
was treated as "other property" within the meaning of § 351(b).
This deficiency was upheld by the Tax Court and not appealed.
66. The income required to be included was the excess of the payables
over the aggregate adjusted basis of the assets transferred:
$17,237 - Accounts payable
1,383 - Aggregate adjusted basis of property transferred
$15,854 - Gain realized
67. 370 F.2d at 924.
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in methods of accounting and prevented taxation where there was
no possibility that tax avoidance could result.
There is no justification for making an accounting method inad-
vertently chosen by the taxpayer determinative of the tax bene-
fits and disadvantages of that taxpayer. ... The application of
a combination of Section 351 and 357(c) to trap an individual
merely because he is a cash basis taxpayer rather than an accrual
basis taxpayer is unacceptable.68
Theoretically, there is no room for argument that a taxpayer
should be discriminated against solely on the basis of his method
of accounting. The only difference that should be "countenanced
by the income tax law is the year of the deduction." 69 As a prac-
tical matter, this discrimination does exist.70 But there should
not be inequality based on one's method of reporting income where
the same rule of law is applied to both taxpayers and the Bongio-
vanni decision does achieve this result.
VI. THE ALTERNATIVES*
The tax consequences of section 357(c) as applied to a cash ba-
sis taxpayer depends on whether the reasoning of Bongiovanni or
Raich is followed. The Bongiovanni interpretation ignores the ex-
press statutory language and introduces a distinction of question-
able validity between tax liabilities and accounting liabilities in
order to reach a more "just" result in terms of equality between
taxpayers. Although this construction eliminates the harsh result
of Raich, whether the court was justified in ignoring the express
language of the statute is somewhat questionable. But most impor-
tant, does the statute, assuming it is subject to the Bongiovanni
interpretation, promote equality between accrual and cash basis
taxpayers?
Assume7l T, an accrual basis taxpayer, transfers all of the as-
sets of his sole proprietorship, worth 20,000 dollars consisting solely
of accounts receivables, to XYZ corporation. In exchange T receives
68. Id.
69. Charles R. Stuart, 38 B.T.A. 1147, 1151 (1938).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 113-17 (1966); Willging
v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-785 (9th Cir. 1973).
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mr. William T.
Plumb, Jr., of 'Washington, D.C., who read the manuscript of this
section and made many valuable suggestions. However, the views
expressed and conclusions drawn are those of the author alone, for
which he is solely responsible.
71. For purposes of discussion, assume in each hypothetical presented
that during the year in which the exchange was made the transferor
and transferee have no other assets, liabilities or income from any
other source except the receivables and payables.
546 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 52, NO. 4 (1973)
all of XYZ's capital stock plus the corporation's assumption of
15,000 dollars in accounts payable. Assume further that T reports
his income on a calendar basis and that the transfer is made on
January 15. Since T is on the accrual method of accounting, his
taxable income (without regard to the exchange) for the year in
which the transfer was made would be 5,000 dollars. T's adjusted
basis in his receivables would be 20,000 dollars because these items
were previously taken into income.72 Therefore, since his adjusted
basis exceeds the liabilities transferred, section 357(c) is not ap-
plicable and T would not be taxed on the exchange.73
Following the example to its conclusion, T's adjusted basis in
the stock of XYZ would be 20,000 dollars (the same as the property
exchanged) minus 15,000 dollars (the amount of liabilities as-
sumed), or a net amount of 5,000 dollars.74 At this point, if T were
to sell his stock in XYZ corporation for 5,000 dollars, he would real-
ize no gain on the sale.7 5 It is readily apparent that T's economic
position is the same as if the exchange had never taken place.
The XYZ corporation would have a substituted basis of 20,000
dollars in the receivables 76 and would not realize gain upon their
receipt. However, XYZ would not be allowed a deduction for the
payables. 77 Therefore, where the transferor utilizes the accrual
method of accounting under section 357 (c), the transfer is a com-
plete wash. This construction is totally in keeping with the Con-
gressional purpose of facilitating business readjustments with a
minimum amount of disruption.
Now assume the same set of facts, except that T is a cash basis
taxpayer.
Under the interpretation given section 357(c) in Raich, T's ad-
justed basis in his receivables will be zero, but his payables will be
valued at face. Since his liabilities exceed his adjusted basis in the
assets transferred, section 357(c) applies and T must recognize
15,000 dollars on the exchange. T's basis in the stock received will
72. See Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
73. The conclusion that the taxpayer is not taxed on the exchange as-
sumes that CODE § 357 (b) (1) is not applicable.
74. CODE § 358.
75. CODE § 1001.
76. CODE § 362 governs the corporation's basis in the assets transferred.
It provides for the same basis the assets had in the hands of the
transferor, increased by the amount of gain recognized by the trans-
feror on the exchange. In this hypothetical, since T had a $20,000
basis in the receivables and recognized no gain on the exchange,
XYZ's basis would also be $20,000.
77. See note 83 infra and the authorities cited therein.
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be zero since the adjusted basis of the assets transferred have a
zero basis, and the gain recognized on the exchange equals the
amount of liabilities assumed.78 If T now sells his stock in the
XYZ corporation for 5,000 dollars, he would realize a gain in that
amount on the sale. The corporation, on the other hand, will have
a 15,000 dollars adjusted basis in the receivables.7 9 As a result,
when XYZ accrues or receives the 20,000 dollars in receivables, it
will be taxed on 5,000 dollars.
Under the Bongiovanni interpretation of section 357(c), T still
must take a zero basis in his receivables; but since accounts pay-
able were held not to be liabilities for tax purposes, they are also
valued at zero. Therefore, because liabilities do not exceed the ad-
justed basis of the assets transferred, no gain is recognized on the
exchange. In addition, T's adjusted basis in the stock received
would be zero.80
The corporation's adjusted basis in the receivables would also
be zero.81 Therefore, it would recognize income of 20,000 dollars
when the receivables are accrued or received. Under both Bongi-
78. CODE § 358. From the substituted basis of zero, § 358 requires that
the transferor decrease his basis by the amount of liabilities assumed
and increase it by the amount of gain recognized on the exchange.
Therefore, since T is required to recognize $15,000 on the exchange
and the XYZ corporation assumed $15,000 in liabilities, his adjusted
basis in the stock received would be zero.
79. CODE § 362. Since T recognized $15,000 on the exchange, the cor-
porate transferee is allowed to increase its substituted basis in the
assets transferred by that amount.
80. Although the basis of the transferor's stock was not an issue in
Bongiovanni, the word "liabilities" should be given the same con-
struction in both §§ 357(c) and 358(d). Thus, in Bongiovanni since
no liabilities were assumed under § 357(c), his basis under § 358(d)
should be the same as the aggregate adjusted basis of the assets
transferred. As applied to the hypothetical in the text, T's adjusted
basis in the stock would be zero, the same as his basis in his receiv-
ables. It has recently been suggested in CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. 8216 that the term 'liabilities" in § 358 should not be construed
consistently with the same term in § 357(c). As a result, the author
argues that the transferor may be required to take a negative basis in
his stock received in order to prevent complete escape from taxation
rather than mere deferral. It is true that the potential gain on the
stock received should equal the potential gain on the assets trans-
ferred. But with the cash basis taxpayer transferring accounts re-
ceivable and payable, the taxpayer's potential taxable gain on assets
transferred should be taken into account because he has not previously
been allowed a deduction for the payables. Therefore, in the text
hypothetical T's potential taxable gain on the assets transferred is$5,000 the same as his potential taxable gain if he later sells his stock.
81. CODE § 362. See also P.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d
718, 720 (7th Cir. 1940); EZO Products Co., 37 T.C. 385, 392-93 (1961).
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ovanni and Raich the question arises whether the corporation
should be allowed a deduction when it pays or accrues the pay-
ables. The authorities are in conflict on this point. Under Raich
the amount of the payables, having been taxed to the transferor,
enters into the basis of the corporation's assets, therefore, it is dif-
ficult to see how they could be consistently held to be deductible
by the corporation. On the other hand, the court in Bongiovanni
by way of dictum recited that the corporation should be allowed a
deduction whether the cash basis transferor is taxed on the ex-
change or not.8 2 The courts as well as most commentators have
generally agreed that the corporation should not be allowed a de-
duction with respect to this issue in section 351 transfers.8 3 The
rationale given for denial of a corporate deduction in these in-
stances is that assumed liabilities are part of the corporation's ac-
quisition costs for the assets. If this is correct, then the corpora-
tion's basis in the assets transferred should be adjusted upward to
reflect this, regardless of whether gain is recognized or not. A
firmer basis on which to deny the deduction would seem to be
that, since it was not incurred by the corporation, it is simply not
its liability.8 4 This view at least is more consistent with the pres-
ent basis provisions in effect. It has been reported that provided
the parties are willing to enter a closing agreement assuring that
the corporation will report the receivables as income when col-
lected, the service will not only tax the corporation rather than the
individual on the assigned gross income but will also allow the
corporation to deduct the payables.8 5 Since Bongiovanni does not
specifically resolve this issue, there appears to be a significant fu-
ture problem if other courts follow the rationale of Bongiovanni.
Assuming the corporation is not allowed a deduction for the pay-
ables under Raich but would be under Bongiovanni, a summary of
the preceding hypotheticals is as follows:
82. 370 F.2d at 925. The regulation the court cites in support of its dic-
tum, however, is inapposite.
-' 83. Birmingham Business College v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 476, 481(5th Cir. 1960); Holdcroft Trans. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323(8th Cir. 1946); Burke & Chisholm, supra note 8, at 230; Tritt &
Spencer, Current Tax Problems in Incorporation of a Going Business,
U. So. CAL. 1958 TAx INST. 71, 98, 99; Surrey, supra note 9, at 21 n.69.
But cf. Note, supra 38, at 1168 where the author suggests that if
payables are not treated as liabilities for purposes of § 357(c), the
corporate transferee would be allowed a deduction.
84. See Tritt & Spencer, supra note 83, at 98-99.
85. See Points to Remember, 18 A.B.A. TAx SECT. Buu,. No. 3 at 114(1965); Hewitt, How to Avoid the Common Tax Problems in Forming
or Dissolving a Partnership, 24 J. TAx. 294, 298 (1966). But cf. Tax
Management Memo 66-16 (Aug. 1, 1966).
SECTION 357 (c)
CASH- CASH-
INDIVIDUAL TAX ACCRUAL BONGIOVANNI RAICH
CURRENT
As earned 5,000 0 0
On transfer 0 0 15,000
TOTAL CURRENT 5,000 0 15,000
DEFERRED
On sale of stock or on dividend 0 5,000 5,000
TOTAL CURRENT & DEFERRED 5,000 5,000 20,000
CORPORATE TAX
CURRENT 0 5,000 5,000
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL & CORPORATE 5,000 1O, 00 25,000
Before the tax treatment of accrual and cash basis taxpayers
can be compared under either interpretation, one must be cog-
nizant of the effect of assignment of income principles. The re-
sults of the above summary reveal that the cash basis taxpayer
under either view of section 357(c) has effectively shifted all of
his taxable income to the transferee corporation. Therefore, even
though T may successfully convince a court that the Bongiovanni
reasoning is correct, the IRS may counter with an assignment of
income argument. Simply because section 351 provides for non-
recognition of gain, it does not mean that the assignment of in-
come doctrine is necessarily inapplicable.8 6 There does, however,
seem to be substantial authority which would dictate an opposite
conclusion. In Thomas W. Briggs, 7 the Tax Court held that a cash
basis transferor was not taxable on accounts received that were ul-
timately collected by the corporation. The same result was
reached in Arthur L. Kniffen8 8 where the taxpayer transferred ac-
crued interest on notes and deeds of trust. However, in both
Briggs and Kniffen the Tax Court did not specifically discuss as-
signment of income principles. In fact, once it was determined that
section 351 applied, the court made no further inquiry as to
whether gain would be recognized under any other theory. Both
courts sub silentio seemed to imply that the purpose behind the
nonrecognition provisions outweighed any assignment income prin-
ciples. In H. B. Zachary Co.,8 9 the Tax Court sanctioned the trans-
fer of a carved-out oil payment as "property" within the meaning
of section 351 and held that the transferor did not recognize in-
come upon receipt of the stock. The IRS did not even try to tax
86. See BITTKER & EUsTIcE, supra note 7, 3.17 at 3-59; Biblin, Assign-
ments of Income in Connection With Incorporating and Liquidating
Corporations, U. So. CAL. 1969 TAX INST. 383.
87. 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. % 56.086 (1956).
88. 39 T.C. 553 (1962).
89. 49 T.C. 73 (1967).
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the assignor on income from the "property" that was realized by
the assignee, which is the proper time under the assignment the-
ory. 0 Furthermore in note 5 of the opinion, the court stated that
it was not considering whether the assignor might be taxed under
the assignment of income theory91
There is some authority that assignment of income principles
do apply to section 351 transfers, but each decision applying that
doctrine can be distinguished.9 2 Nevertheless, if the Bongiovanni
reasoning is accepted, the IRS may press harder for the application
of assignment of income principles.
Therefore, if the Briggs-Kniffen premise is accepted that it is
within the purpose of section 351 to permit the taxability of cur-
rent income to be shifted from the earner to his corporation, then
the above summary indicates that Bongiovanni does reach a sound
result with respect to current tax liabilities. Both the accrual and
cash basis taxpayer are treated equally on the exchange; the only
difference being that the accrual is currently taxed on 5,000 dol-
lars as an individual whereas the cash basis taxpayer is allowed to
shift his current tax liability to the corporation. Admittedly, this
does promote some inequality, but with respect to section 357(c)
both are treated equally by allowing each to transfer receivables
and payables at the same tax cost. In contrast to Bongiovanni, the
Raich interpretation does not promote equality, but instead cur-
rently taxes both the individual and the corporation.
It is true that under Bongiovanni and Raich an additional 5,000
dollars will be taxed if the cash basis taxpayer sells his stock or
withdraws dividends in excess of what the corporation later earns
from its own operations. But this "double tax" effect is the in-
evitable result of our dual tax system, whereby, barring death,
any income taxed to the corporation will ultimately be taxed to the
shareholder.
The price of shifting taxability of earned but uncollected in-
come to the corporation is inflation of the amount ultimately sub-
90. Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946); Sol
C. Siegel Productions, 46 T.C. 15 (1966); Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (d) (4);
Rev. Rul 69-102, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 32.
91. The service's reluctance to apply assignment of income principles in§ 351 transfers is illustrated by the fact that in Jack Amman Photo-
grammetric Eng'rs v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 466, 468-69 (5th Cir.
1965) the court criticized the service for not attempting to apply the
assignment rule in this area yet the commissioner dismissed his ap-
peal to the same court in Zachary.
92. See Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944);
Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940); Adolph Wein-
berg, 44 T.C. 233 (1965); Clinton Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941). See
also Biblin, supra note 86, at 390.
• SECTION 357 (c)
ject to this second tax. But the price paid by the taxpayer under
the Bongiovanni interpretation does not promote total equality be-
tween the accrual and cash basis taxpayers. It will not close the
gap unless the cash basis taxpayer sells his stock within six months
after the exchange. Only then will he also be required to include
the 5,000 dollars in ordinary income. Considering the reasons most
sole proprietorships incorporate, it is highly unlikely that the stock
will be sold at all. It is possible, for example, that the stockholder
will hold the stock until death, in which case it will receive a
stepped-up basis.93 At the very least, it will be held longer than six
months, in which case the taxpayer will receive capital gain treat-
ment. Admittedly, if the corporation is not allowed a deduction for
the payables, this also will tend to compensate somewhat for the
disparity in treatment, but this question is not resolved by Bon-
giovanni. Another partial remedy at the corporate level is that the
cash basis taxpayer's controlled corporation will be required to
recognize income upon collection of the receivables, but this also
may be more beneficial to the cash basis transferor where his
marginal rate of tax is at a higher level than the corporation.
Even though this inequality does exist under Bongiovanni, it
does not result from the court's interpretation of section 357 (c),
but from a rule entirely independent which allows the individual
to shift his potential income to a controlled corporation. Since
the Bongiovanni interpretation does treat both accrual and cash
basis taxpayers equally with respect to the exchange, its reasoning
should be adopted.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the overall policy reasons behind section 351 favor non-
recognition upon incorporation, any doubtful construction of sec-
tion 357(c) should be resolved to further that purpose. It is ex-
tremely doubtful that Congress intended to include the cash basis
taxpayer's accounting liabilities within the meaning of the term
"liabilities" as it is used in the statute. To do so would frustrate
the policy reasons behind the nonrecognition provisions.
One point, however, should be made clear. No matter what
construction is given to section 357(c), where receivables and pay-
ables are involved complete equality between accrual and cash
basis taxpayers cannot be achieved. As the court in Bongiovanni
observed: "We see no reason why different consequences under
section 357(c) should arise from identical circumstances because
of the wholly unrelated section of an accounting method."94 Ad-
93. CODE § 1014(a).
94. 370 F.2d at 925.
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mittedly, the Bongiovanni reasoning does provide for nonrecogni-
tion under section 357(c) in both the accrual and the cash basis tax-
payer's transfer to a controlled corporation. But the transaction
viewed as a whole does not produce equality. The Raich decision,
on the other hand, totally frustrates the purpose of the tax-free
exchange provisions and is totally unacceptable to the cash basis
taxpayer.
Although Bongiovanni is preferable, the only reasonable solu-
tion is the enactment of legislation to remedy the existing dispari-
ties. One approach may be to require the cash basis taxpayer to
accrue all receivables and payables prior to incorporation. 5 What-
ever steps are taken, to allow a taxpayer's method of accounting
to result in unequal tax treatment under identical circumstances
is unacceptable.
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95. See Burke & Chisholm, supra note 8, at 232.
